Do you think if the interest subsidy scheme launched by the new budget is based on rational economic decision-making? Will this program help boost the flow of credit into agriculture – or may end up reducing it? Past domestic and international experience with interest subsidies on rural lending, dependent as they are on government budgetary funds -- does not support this policy.
The interest rate subsidy program also ignores the earlier government committee recommendation that interest subsidy element in credit for the priority sectors (including agriculture) should be totally eliminated! What is important for intended beneficiaries is the timely and adequate availability of credit rather than the cost of credit!
Finance Minister Mr. Chidambaram’s budget speech on February 28 started with a quotation from Swami Vivekanand: “We reap what we sow – we are the makers of our own destiny”. So true! But will India’s millions of farmers, poor and non-poor, be able to reap more produce and improve their own destiny by interest subsides?
At issue is not whether farmers deserve subsidies – we have to address this question taking into account a range of macro-and micro-economic aspects, including the need for targeting scare resources to farmers below certain income levels or those below the poverty line (BPLs) --- but the problem is that the interest rate subsidy might allow prosperous farmers (especially those growing cash crops like sugar cane, horticulture, and livestock) to grab this assistance to the exclusion of the poor farmers – usually those dependent on producing grain crops in rain-fed areas. Since they lack access to bank credit – either because they are not viable or the credit institutions serving them have become non-viable -- how the interest-rate subsidies will reach them?
The new budget initiative is expected to provide a one-time relief to farmers, who availed of crop loans from Scheduled Commercial Banks (SCBs), Regional Rural Banks (RRBs), and Primary Agricultural Credit Societies (PACS) for Kharif and Rabi of 2005-06, in an amount equal to 2 percentage points of the borrowers’ interest liability on the principal amount up to Rs. 100,000. This amount will be credited to their bank accounts before March 31, 2006. GOI will provide a budget allocation of Rs. 1700 crores for this purpose.
Also, with effect from Kharif 2006-07, farmers will receive from SCBs, RRBs and PACS, short-term credit at a low interest of 7 per cent, on loans below the threshold of Rs. 300,000. GOI will provide a subvention to NABARD for this – it is unclear yet how NABARD will administer this scheme. The cost of this new policy to the taxpayer is not readily available but could run into crores of rupees.
In India, the public sector involvement in rural credit started with the All India Rural Credit Survey Report in 1954. It not only did endure over the past five decades but over time deepened and played a dominant role. The government could do this because much of the commercial banking sector came into the public ownership in 1969 and while the cooperatives came to be subject to state control and funding as an outcome of public policy to ensure increased and sustained supply for priority sectors including agricultural production, and for poverty alleviation objectives.
Not long ago, in 1991 and 1998, the two Committees chaired by Mr. M. Narasimham- the Committee on Financial System and the Committee on Banking System Reforms -- took note of the problems with government -directed credit provided on concessional terms (including interest-subsidies) and recommended that it be phased out with required changes in interest rate policies.
As regards commercial banks’ directed credit program (including priority sector lending), Narasimham Committee I (1991) noted that they had played a useful purpose in extending reach of the banking system to cover sectors, which were neglected hitherto. Despite considerable unproductive lending, there was evidence that that contribution of bank credit to growth of agriculture and small industry did make an impact. However, this Committee called for re-examination of the relevance of directed credit programs at least in respect of those (a) who were able to stand on their own feet and (b) to whom directed credit programs with the interest concessionality had become a source of rent.
While recognizing that during the two decades -- 1970s and 80s, - the banking and credit policies had been deployed with a re-distributive objective, the Narasimham Committee believed that the pursuit of such an objective should be the instrumentality of the fiscal sector rather than of the credit system.
In part, the interest subsidy scheme will indeed be funded by fiscal resources but its distortionary effect on the banking sector will be quite serious in that due to GOI regulation that interest rates on agricultural loans up to Rs. 300,000 should not exceed 7% p.a., the banking system will not be ble to lend to these clientele from its own resources -- except without loss, thereby limiting the access of millions of farmers to credit that cannot be subsidized by the government due to fiscal constraints.
Narasimham Committee II (1998) revisited issues concerning banking sector’s directed credit and interest rates and observed that the asset quality had further suffered as a result of directed lending, an outcome not much different from international experience. Directed credit apart from leading to possible misapplication or misallocation of credit resources, had led to an increase in non-performing loans and adversely affected efficiency and viability of banks.
In an environment of directed credit (or priority lending), bank managers are under pressure to meet the targets and in the process credit discipline suffers; borrowers willingly default because they believe creditors will not take legal action against those considered to be in the priority sectors.
Narasimham Committee (II) reemphasized that except for priority lending up to 10% of net bank credit earmarked for lending to weaker sections, the rest of the directed credit be phase out while continuing to lend for agriculture and small scale sector on commercial considerations and on the basis of creditworthiness.
Thus, if the expected benefits of the proposed interest subsidies are so much in question, why did you think the government thought of reintroducing this failed program in this year's budget?
(Note: The views expressed in this post are purely personal).